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Biographical Note
Lee Enfield Lockwood was born February 17, 1946 in Cumberland, Maryland, to Sarah and Sam
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Transcript
Don Nicoll: It is Wednesday the 18th of September 2002. We are in Washington, D.C. at the
home of Lee Lockwood, 3122 38th Street NW, and Don Nicoll is interviewing Ms. Lockwood.
Lee, the last time we were talking, you finished with your description of writing speeches for the
senator and particularly the involvement in Vietnam issues. I'd like to go back to that time and
ask you if there are any other observations you have on the whole process of writing speeches

for the senator.
Lee Lockwood: It wasn't generally a lot of fun. I was not the principal speechwriter by and
large. I did more floor statements, which generally didn't cause much of an issue. They were
sort of a lot of boilerplate. I was the only speechwriter for about I guess the last nine months I
was there. And, I assume that you've talked to Alfred Friendly and to Bob Radcliff, both of
whom wrote speeches for Muskie for quite a long time, although after, they both were at IGR
when they were writing speeches. They have wonderful stories to tell, more than I do, because
they did it for so long. Muskie always gave whoever wrote the speeches a really hard time. He
would, I’ve heard Bob Radcliff talk about, I think it was the Liberal Party speech, the speech that
Muskie gave in 1970, was it? No, it wasn’t 1970.
DN:

No, it would be after that.

LL: Yeah, it was after, '76 let's say, something like that, in New York. And it was this very
important speech; it was about new directions for the Democratic Party. It was a fabulous
speech, but the first time Bob Radcliff handed it to Muskie, Muskie made some incredibly
acerbic, nasty comment about it, like, “I'm supposed to give this piece of garbage” or something
like that. You know, I, those anecdotes are best going to come from other people. I found, but I
talked about this last time, the last speech that I wrote for him, the one that was so important to
me, I think was, either he was humoring me or I think it was, you see, I left right after that so I
don't, and I don't, I didn't really follow his daily course after that. And he went to the State
Department and a lot of things changed.
I like to think that that speech, which he never asked a single question about, I gave it to him, he
may have said something like, “Why does she want me to give a speech on this subject?” But he
gave it without any change. And that was like, for me, heaven, you know, going out without any
questions, without any changes. It wasn't a policy speech, it was a value speech and, you know,
it was important. I mean, ten years later everybody was talking about community, and the
importance of community, and I think Muskie sort of helped to get that going. So that was very
rewarding for me. But I have to say that by and large, again I'm talking about me, by and large
speech writing was not a pleasant undertaking.
DN:

Did you enjoy the writing but not the interactions?

LL: Right, exactly, exactly. I mean, he was actually, he was, I think he was more deferential
probably to women. I think he gave Alfred and Bob a horrendously rough time. He just
humiliated them. They would come back to the office and tell stories about, and I, like I said, I
assume you've talked to them. Alfred was a brilliant writer, very, very gifted, very eccentric but
very fast and, it was pretty, he did a good job of giving Muskie generally what Muskie wanted.
Bob Radcliff was also. Bob Radcliff was a very, very strong, dependable speechwriter who was,
you know, wrote for probably three or four years. He's in Florida, have you seen him?
DN:

No, both Al and Bob are on our list, and trying to set up dates with them now.

LL:

Alfred's right over here on the Macomb Street.

DN: Carole [Parmelee] has talked to him in November of this year; I'm supposed to come back
and catch him probably. Did you and, other than kibitzing about what it was like writing
speeches for Muskie, did you and Al Friendly and Bob Radcliff have interactions about specific
speeches, giving each other advice or editorial comments?
LL: I would say generally, yes. But they were, Alfred, they weren't there at the same time, so
Alfred had his turn, and then Bob Radcliff had his turn. And to the extent that I contributed, it
would have been, you know, they said, “Lee, take a look at this. What do you think?” I mean,
they were definitely senior to me on the staff and they didn't have any . . . . But the IGR staff
was very close, it was a wonderful group of people, and so there was definitely a, your old friend
Lori Williams [Ransome] was there. But no, I can't say that there was a lot of collaboration
between me and them.
DN: I'd like to drop back to your departure from the speech writing role in the 1970-'72 period
and into the boiler room.
LL:

Well, I wasn't writing speeches in '70-'72.

DN: Oh, that's right, my recollection is off. But let's go back to the boiler room and that
experience, and refresh our memories on what it was you had to do.
LL: Well, I had, there were five or six people in the boiler room, and each of us was assigned a
certain number of states. I don't remember if they were all primary states. I had New Hampshire
and Massachusetts, Iowa, I can't remember the other two. And our job was to sort of, to be a
liaison between the Washington staff, which included the political coordinators for each region,
and the people on the ground in our states, whom we had either hired or, not necessarily even
Muskie people, political types in the state. I guess it was a very classic process, going back not
too far, but the woman who ran it, Barbara Coleman, had been in the boiler room in the John
Kennedy campaign and I guess this was modeled on that. And the whole purpose of it was to
further delegate, you know, both delegate collection and primary wins. We, there was a fair
amount of telephone work.
I remember, one story that I remember was Tony Podesta, who was the out-of-state coordinator,
we had like an out-of-state coordinator and an in-state coordinator for every state. And Tony
was the out-of-state coordinator for New Hampshire, which was the first primary and which got
a tremendous amount of resources as a result. Tony sent out a mass mailing to voters in New
Hampshire, and it was a postcard. It was like a fold-over postcard, and you detached, one part of
it had a list of issues, there must have been twenty issues, and people were supposed to check off
the ones they were interested in. And at the bottom he had a blank that said, “other”. And, so
part of my job was to get the information, if people wrote in and checked off crime and housing,
to get our position paper back to them. We're talking about thousands of people here. So that
was pretty drudgery, but the real part of it was that the people who wrote in the 'other' blank. I
could have shot Tony for that. There were people who wrote in complaining about the dirty
movie theater on Main Street in Manchester, New Hampshire, about which we could do
absolutely nothing.

But the boiler room was, you know, kids, I say kids, young adults in their twenties, worked
really long hours, definitely a feeling of camaraderie, no contact with the candidate, none
whatsoever. The kind of job you could probably only get, you know, twenty, an early-twenties
person, to do.
DN:

To whom did you report?

LL:

We reported to Barbara.

DN:

Barbara. And how were your states selected?

LL: That I don't know, because I was the last person to join the boiler room. I had left the
Senate staff in May, and basically took the summer off; there was nothing there for me at the
time. And over the summer I got in touch with probably Gayle and George Mitchell, and they
put me, it was probably George, he put me into the boiler room. I guess George was actually,
Barbara reported to George. Was George the politic-, then there was Jack DN:

He was probably the political director, and Jack English was involved.

LL: So by the time I came into the boiler room in September, it had, the assignments were
already made, so that's what I got.
DN: If you were last in line and they assigned you those states, it's a curious set of states to
leave to the last.
LL: Well, Massachusetts was a fairly light primary, and maybe they figured they had New
Hampshire in the bag.
DN: Did you have many interactions with people in the states, in Massachusetts, New
Hampshire and Iowa?
LL: Not in Iowa. Iowa was not a primary; I guess it was a caucus state. I want to say, what's
his name, was Dick Leone involved in Iowa? I can't remember who the out-of-state coordinator
was for Iowa. And I have vague recollections of names, of talking to people on the phone. New
Hampshire was a much more immediate focus. I spent a lot of time on the phone with Maria
Carrier who was the National, I think the National Democratic Committeewoman, and who was
also the head of the Muskie campaign there. There was quite a good size staff. Interestingly
enough, John Podesta, who was pretty wet behind the ears at that point, I think he worked for Joe
Duffy, as Tony had. John Podesta ended up working in New Hampshire along with a guy named
Larry Kudlow, who has subsequently become a mad right winger, and (unintelligible phrase). I
don't think he DN:

You see him on television.

LL:

Yeah, you see him on television. I doubt that you're going to talk to him, and I doubt that

he ever had any contact with Muskie. But it was an interesting group of people up there. And I
had, yes, I had a great deal, I talked with them many times every day. My job was to make sure
they had whatever they needed for Washington to get, you know, it was more of a logistics kind
of coordinator.
DN: What sense did you get from those conversations as to their feelings about the campaign
in New Hampshire. Were they optimistic, nervous?
LL: That's also where I met Larry Benoit, who was a brilliant bright star in that whole New
Hampshire thing. He was steady as a, I mean he, I forget what town but he, they always joked
about it, I can't believe I can't remember, but he won this town by some huge amount, much
higher than the state average. I think until the crying thing, I think that changed, my recollection
is that changed everything. I seem to recall people grousing that John Podesta had like zero
experience, and that, it was a mistake to have him with so much responsibility there. To tell you
the truth, I can't remember who was on top, whether it was John or Larry Kudlow. Larry didn't
come in until DN:

John or Tony?

LL: Well, Tony was the overall, he was the out-of-state political director. I'm talking about
the in-state, the people running the staff, the people running the phone banks, the canvassing,
the, you know, all that kind of stuff. And my, you know, my recollection is that the crying thing
changed things. People didn't know how to react to it. And that if there was, there was sort of an
inevitability. It was never the kind of campaign that generated wild enthusiasm. I think it got
like too big downtown, too fast or something, it was like Washington heavy, it just wasn't a . . . .
Because it was never an underdog, you know, we had all these endorsements and it was always
assumed that this was going to, there was almost a fait accompli about it, that it wasn't the kind
of campaign, it didn't have the kind of excitement that you get when you're really fighting for
something. And I never had that feeling about New Hampshire, and when the crying thing
happened it was, well, ‘What do we do now?’ kind of thing. I mean, you go on. But I, this is a
long time ago.
DN:

Oh, sure. Now, you continued in that role until the end of the campaign?

LL: Well, things got liquidated pretty fast. I went up to New Hampshire at the end of the New
Hampshire campaign, I mean just because a lot of people went up there. That was a tremendous
letdown. I went from there to Massachusetts, the Massachusetts primary. Let's see, New
Hampshire was March 7, certain dates I can remember, and Massachusetts was April 23rd or
25th, so there was quite a bit of time. Actually, I guess I went to Wisconsin for a while and
worked out in Wisconsin in a town called Manitowoc. Again, no enthusiasm, no enthusiasm for
the Muskie campaign, no sense of momentum.
And Florida came somewhere in there, you know, I think Florida was before, Florida was really
bad, is my recollection. And there wasn't the, what enthusiasm there was in Wisconsin was the,
McGovern, with the students. There was no, I'd never been through one of these before. But
people talking about the '68 campaign and how much fun it was and how, I mean not just fun

from a party sense but fun from, you know, you’re really working to come from behind. No, I
never had that sense. So however we did, I think we did very poorly in Wisconsin. And then I
went to Massachusetts, but that was, I don't think I have those reversed. Massachusetts was a
death watch. Do you remember when Wisconsin -?
DN:

I forget the sequence of those primaries.

LL: I think Massachusetts was the last one. And I talked about that a little bit in the last one,
where the people running it were all outsiders. See, you were talking a little while ago about this
sense of Maine people, and all these people that came in from the get-go, from McEvoy on, were
outsiders. And they were hired presumably because they were good at what they did, and they
were good at what needed to be done. But I always thought that somewhere in this mess, the
whole point of why people wanted Muskie to do this was somehow lost. I mean, it became, what
Jack said, it became a, an exercise in money, ballots and delegates, and I don't know how you
avoid that. But, because Muskie himself was reticent as a campaigner, it probably exacerbated
that whole imbalance thing.
DN: At the end of that campaign you took off for a while, and then you came back to the
Senate.
LL: I did. I toyed with the idea of going to medical school, and was having some other
difficulties then, just family kind of things, and really didn't, that wasn't going to work for me.
And I had stayed in touch with Al From, with Jim Hall. Jim Hall I guess married my roommate,
my former roommate, so I had stayed in touch with all of those people. And they had an opening
at IGR and I went to work there. David Johnson was there, Alfred Friendly was there. I assume
you've talked to David. Now David is another person I think with very interesting perspectives,
not unlike those that you mentioned with regard to Jack. I think Muskie really was a father
figure to him in certain ways. Yeah, and Al wanted somebody to come and work on property tax
which is the world's most boring, underappreciated subject. People........anyway.
DN: Now, you had problems in terms of John McEvoy and style, but you did not have
problems, I take it, with Al From.
LL: I adore Al. Al rubbed a lot of people the wrong way, but he and I got along very well. I
think he took me sort of under his wing. McEvoy's style was, I mean I can tell you some, not on
here, but his style was quite abrasive, and he had a long history of problems, of personnel
problems, frankly.
And Al didn't, Al was extremely loyal to his people, and he hired people that he wanted to hire.
He was one of the most, he is one of the most creative people I've ever met in politics. He is a
genius at taking a sow's ear and turning it into a silk purse. He took this obscure subcommittee
and took on the Intelligence community, the budget, well, that's where budget, the budget bill
came out of. He was extraordinary, very, very, one of my favorite people. I got along with him
very well.
DN:

And when you went to work for him, where was the committee in terms of the kinds of

initiatives you were just referring to?
LL: Well, I went there in the spring of '73, and the Budget Act was passed in '74, so, and I was
not part of that. I don't know, actually I don't know who worked on that from within the
committee. Because Ike had left, [Edwin] Ike Webber had left I think, or maybe he was on the
full committee staff. So that was going on, and the Intelligence stuff came later. We had this
legislation called Sunset legislation that we worked . . . . Oh, I know what we worked on then,
was this thing called counter cyclical, which was an economic, well, an employment activated,
unemployment activated anti-recession program for state and local governments. And it was
actually a pretty big deal; I think it saved the city of Detroit from going bankrupt. Coleman
Young was our most ardent client and was the mayor of Detroit then. Arguably, Detroit should
have gone bankrupt and . . . . (telephone interruption).
Counter cyclical was great fun. We had a, it was mostly county, AFSCME, a federation of state,
county and municipal employees were in our office all the time. Obviously this was going to
help protect their jobs. But there was a big recession going on and local, state and local
governments were cutting services, and it was seen at the time as kind of a big deal. I think
revenue sharing is completely gone by the wayside now. This was something only that cut on
and off when the unemployment in a certain area reached a certain point. It was just a lot of fun,
because it was something that actually got passed, and actually, you know, the money actually
went out, and by and large people did useful things with it. I know that one, some community . .
. . What happens with these formula programs is that you start out wanting to focus it, to target
it, but then in order to get it passed you have to broaden the, broaden it, so that everybody gets a
piece of the action.
So we ended up with some affluent communities in Colorado doing things like building a
municipal putting green or something, there's a little bit of embarrassing things like that. But by
and large the money went into serious municipal functions like schools, police, fire, you know,
fire trucks and hardware. But it was a lot of fun, and I'm sure it lapsed. And Muskie really got
into that, that was an early IGR thing that he, he enjoyed that.
DN: Now during, in the work on the counter cyclical program and revenue sharing, were you
working on that or were you working on your property tax issues and feeding into it?
LL:

When was, when were the Watergate hearings?

DN:

Seventy-three.

LL:

Seventy-three? You think? The Ervin hearings?

DN:

I think they were '73.

LL:

Not '74?

DN:

They ran into '74, but I thought they started in '73.

LL: Well, anyway, the property tax never really sort of got off the ground. We were going to
do an exposé of coal mining companies and their property tax exemptions, or special treatment,
in Appalachia. We worked with a group called SOCM, which was Save Our Cumberland
Mountains, run by a very energetic young woman, well now she's my age, by the name of
Heleny Cook. And we did, she was actually sort of the field person. There were lots and lots of,
there was a lot of evidence that the coal companies were getting away with murder in terms of
not paying their, in terms of not paying their share, and we're talking about really poor
communities, you know, dumping their, it was one of the early anti-coal company issues. And it
just never went anywhere. We started to do it, we geared up to think about hearings. And
Watergate came along and it just sort of subsumed everything, the Watergate hearings. Nobody,
I don't know if any work got done by the federal government anywhere. I don't know if I should
say this, but we would come in to work and turn on the television and watch, and the whole
government was just at a standstill. So counter cyclical would have been sort of percolating
along through all of this. We didn't do, revenue sharing was already an existing program, this
was not, that was not something that we did. Although when it would come up for renewal, Jane
Fenderson worked on that.
DN: The, over that period you've mentioned some of the things that the subcommittee got into
as a result of Al's initiative and others. How did it evolve beyond the counter cyclical program,
and after Watergate? When you got back to work after Watergate, what happened?
LL: Well, you know, I ran into Muskie at a reception in honor of Judge [David L.] Bazelon
sometime, you know, in 1990 or something. And we got to talking and he, I don't think I said
this in our last interview, he said, you know, he said, “I really, that committee, that subcommittee
was the best subcommittee on the entire Hill.” He said, “I'm not sure I always appreciated it
but,” he said, “you know, you could do anything, Intergovernmental Relations, you can do
anything you want.” And what happened was, he had a very creative staff director who would
pepper Muskie with memos about, ‘what do you think about getting into this,’ you know. I don't
really, at this point I don't remember the angle on secrecy, getting into that. But Jim Davidson
could tell you more about that, because he was a staff person who worked on that.
The Sunset stuff came about, because it became clear pretty early that the budget process was
driven by the, what's the word, you know, mandated spending, I can't remember the name. It'll
come to me. But that the whole bud-, because they constituted such an, that these, you know,
interest on the debt, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, plus the Defense budget constituted
such an enormous portion of the budget, that to say Congress was exercising some budgetary
control through its annual process was really sort of a sham. And this began to sink in I guess, as
the budget, you know, the whole process of twice a year budget resolutions, and people began to
. . . . I guess the Budget Committee helped the focus for this by being a collecting house for
information that maybe previously had been scattered around the committees.
And so that was where the impetus for Sunset came, was to try and find, you know, by making
programs renewable, reviewable, to try and find some extra room in the budget, you know this
word, it's driving me nuts, I've been away from, so that's how that came about. And that went,
that lasted for quite a long time. I mean, we actually got it through subcommittee, I don't think
we got it past that. Everybody, all the committee chairmen were mad against it.

DN: The exercise between the Budget Committee and the Intergovernmental Relations
Subcommittee is intriguing here. You said the Budget Committee revealed the problem created
by this massive core of required spending, that wasn't susceptible to change, and the Sunset
legislation emanated from the IGR subcommittee. Was it a matter of continuing interchange
between the staffs?
LL: Oh yeah, because to make the case for Sunset, you needed a lot of budget information.
There was a lot of cross pollination, cross fertilization. I mean, McEvoy was either staff director
or, well he and Doug Bennett were both there, but there were, you know, and John, Al had
worked for John McEvoy and it was actually a very close relationship. We were in the same
building, we were in the Carroll Arms building, they were downstairs. Chris Matthews was
down there, that's how a lot of us first remember him. Yeah, there was a lot of, a lot of back and
forth.
You know, the Budget Committee was not a legislative committee, so. The idea was that these
uncontrollables, uncontrollable spending is what it was called, could only be changed by
statutory, could only be altered by statutory change, so it was the authorizing committees that
had to do that. So in order to sort of, you know, the Sunset, the idea of the Sunset Bill was that it
would set in place a mechanism by which the authorizing committees would be forced to take a
look at these programs that they maybe tended to rubber stamp. Got into the idea of the Iron
Triangle, you know, that the legislators, the lobbyists, and the people who benefit from the
programs, that whole . . . . It was a fascinating subject, fascinating.
DN:

How did Senator Muskie react to the problem of dealing with the Iron Triangle?

LL: Well, I think he saw it as a pretty, I think he took it on as something he wanted to fight.
It's coming back to me now that that is what the Liberal Party speech was basically about. He
delivered it to the Liberal Party of New York, and it was about this budget squeeze, you know.
And we talk about how, you know, we want to use government as a way to help people, but we
don't pay, we sort of, we pass . . . . It's a brilliant speech, and I urge you to back and read it. I
haven't read it for a while. But I think he relished it. The only problem with it was that, that's
not the only problem, but it's hard to write speeches about Sunset because it was, there were a lot
of problems with it. The massive opposition, obviously, but it was also hard, it was a hard
message to get across in public, because speeches about budgets generally don't excite people
very much. But I think he thought it was a great idea.
I mean, you know, if you look at his major legislative projects, you're a better judge of this than I
am, but is there a little bit of bucking the establishment in each of these? There's Clean Air,
there's Clean Water. I don't have any knowledge about the Model Cities thing, I don't have a
feeling about that, but the budget reform was a, you know, bucking the norm. Sunset was
absolutely doing that. And I think he and Al had a, I don't think they had much of a personal
relationship, but I think they, the two of them, and Al is definitely somebody who does that, he's
got this DLC [Democratic Leadership Council] thing going. I think he and Muskie had a
partnership that both of them, you know, that this need maybe in both of them, not a need, but
maybe it was fun, maybe it was fun to sort of, you know, kick a little dirt, and pick up a little

dirt.
DN: I think that was, with Muskie, incidental to his desire to get to the root of a problem, and
to come up with an absolutely rational analysis of what the problem was, what its implications
were.
LL:

No, I didn't mean to trivialize his motives.

DN: Oh no, that's not trivialization, but I think his absolute commitment to follow it through to
its logical conclusion ultimately ran into the opposition, and that's where he began to have fun.
LL: Oh, I see what you're saying. Well certainly, I don't, certainly some kind of legislative
structure was the next logical step after budget reform. Whether it was Sunset, you know, Sunset
may have, it was an idea that had been floating around and somebody grabbed it, and it could
have been a potential nightmare. Maybe it wasn't the answer, but certainly something, there was
something that needed to follow and I don't think anything ever did. So we're probably still, the
uncontrollables are still out there chomping away. There was tax credits, that was another piece
of it.
DN: There's another fascinating part of this that you encountered in one way in writing the
Vietnam speeches, and we saw in other ways in other legislation. And that is that he enjoyed
taking on the sacred cows, but he also searched constantly for the compromises that would build
a base, including perhaps bringing in the sacred cows and making them part of the solution.
LL: I think, a couple of things come to mind, one is what, we had a unanimous vote on the
first Clean Water Act or the first Clean Air Act.
DN:

Clean Air Act.

LL: I don't think Sunset ever really got, he didn't ever really get to try it, he never really got to,
because very quickly after I left he went downtown to the State Department, and that was
quickly, maybe six months. So that never, he never had a chance to really carry it through, and it
would have been really interesting to see how he did that. I'm sure he did it with the Budget
Committee. I'm sure that was a giant exercise in trying to calm egos.
DN: As you look back on those years, particularly in the IGR subcommittee, how did he work
with his Republican colleagues, and also some of his more conservative Democratic colleagues
on the committee?
LL: Well, you better ask Al that. Senator [William “Bill” Victor] Roth [Jr., R-Del.] was the
ranking member on IGR, and actually he, Muskie got him to go along with this. The Peaks, oh
no, that was John Glenn, we had a nickname for Senator, we had nicknames for everybody, but
one of his nicknames was Senator No, and Muskie, you know, he cosponsored, but I don't really
have a good, I don't have a good sense for that. I think IGR was run generally from a pretty
collegial, small, you know, comfy little group.

DN: You referred earlier to the staff of IGR as being a very good staff. Did that include the
Republican staffers?
LL: I was referring to the majority staff. At the moment I can't even recall names of the, I
remember some of the people on Ervin's staff; Sam Ervin was a committee chair. And a guy
named Bob Smith who you probably won't interview, but might have some, you know, some
things to say about Muskie. But I don't, at this point I'm drawing a blank about any DN:

One other individual, you mentioned AFSCME earlier, was Bill Welsh involved in that?

LL:

Oh yes, yes. He is, do you see him?

DN:

See him every so often, yes.

LL:

He has a house in Boothbay, or a cabin.

DN:

Sawyer's Island.

LL: Okay. We actually rented it one summer, my family, for a week. I haven't seen him in
ages. There's a fellow down the street who was the political director for AFSCME, who I run
into at neighborhood gatherings from time to time, and he tells me that Bill is well. I adored
him. And he and his sidekick, Marty Gleason, Bill and Marty, and then Tommy Corcoran, or
Cochran, Cochran, at the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and then he had a sidekick whose name I
can't remember. They worked, they basically lived, I felt like they lived in our offices. Bill was
fabulous, wonderful man.
DN:

At that point, had Hugh Mields left the U.S. Conference of Mayors?

LL:

His name, he was not part of this team. I don't remember that name.

DN:

Okay, and John Gunther?

LL:

John Gunther was maybe head of it.

DN:

He headed it.

LL: And so maybe Tom Cochran was the legislative director. And then there was a woman
who worked with Tom, she's the one whose name I can’t remember. And Coleman Young was
the elected represent-, you know, the president of AFSCME.
DN:

The president of the . . . . .

LL:

And I guess Jerry Wurf was president of AFSCME.

DN:

Okay, as you -

LL:

Bill's a favorite.

DN: As you look back at the, your experiences with Muskie, what strikes you most about him
as a legislator and as a person?
LL: Well, I guess, I would start with the personal and say that I didn't ever feel like I had a
personal relationship with him while I was working for him. He was so intimidating, and I was
more easily intimidated then than I was when I got older. I felt like, so maybe it's me, I felt as he
got older, and I did develop a more, working on this birthday party thing was probably the best
time I had a relationship with him. And oh, I know, we had a committee that was trying to raise,
was it money for the Muskie, some Muskie library or something?
DN:

Oh, for the [Muskie] Archives.

LL: Yeah, that didn't, that somehow, Leon took over that or something. I mean I was on this
committee with Mark Shields and Gayle [Cory] and Eliot [Cutler], and Muskie came to these
meetings, and I think Berl [Bernhard] and, oh what's his name. Whatever happened to that?
DN:

The archives are there.

LL:

Oh, I know, but this was, well, anyway, it doesn't matter.

DN:

Well, the fund raising wasn't as successful as they had hoped.

LL: I felt that he was much more mellow and didn't seem to be as much at war with the world.
That's kind of a, you know, there was kind of an anger in him, or.
DN:

How strong was that anger in '73 when you went back to the IGR committee?

LL: I don't recall hearing much. What I recall, it was all anecdotal, because I didn't actually
ever witness it, but was a lot of it during the earlier period, during the campaign period, temper
tantrums, I mean sort of rages about his schedule or, I never witnessed it personally. And, you
know, I had the feeling that during the '70s while he still was cantankerous he wasn't as, I didn't,
I don't remember hearing, you know, you'd hear about rudeness and brusqueness, but you didn't
hear so much about the temper . . . .
End of Side A
Side B
DN: This is the second side of the interview with Lee Lockwood on the 18th of September
2002, and at the end of the other side I was starting to ask the question, at the beginning of your
work at the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, Lee, 1973, how engaged was Senator
Muskie in the work of the committee?
LL: I don't have a good answer for that. The property tax stuff that I was, which is what I was
working on, was not, but I assume he was engaged because that's when the budget stuff was

going on. And it would have been maybe in the full committee, I don't know, I don't have a good
answer for that.
DN: You were saying that at the time of the eightieth birthday party you found him more
mellow. Did you have chances to interact with him, and also with staff during that period?
LL: For the birthday party? Oh yeah. You came to the party. Gayle and I worked on the
party and, no, I had a great time working on that. That was a lot of fun. And he seemed to enjoy
it. But, you know, I'm not the kind of person that seeks out, you know, to have conversations
with famous people or movie stars. I'm fairly shy, so when I say that I had a better personal
relationship with him, what I mean is that he knew my name and, you know, we could share
some idle chitchat and, like talk about IGR and stuff like that. But we didn't really have, you
know, major conversations. Now you asked me about my overall impression of him as a
legislator.
DN: Yeah, how did you feel he operated, worked, in comparison, for example, with other
senators. Was he different from them, or, I'm not asking for invidious comparisons, but was he
different from other members of the Senate from your observation?
LL: Yeah, he had to be different. He was more effective than lots of them. I mean, I think
immediately of George McGovern, who wrote Public Law 480, Food for Peace, I mean that was
his piece of legislation. And Muskie, I think he must have been widely respected for the depth,
you know, with which he, I think he approached things from a much more thorough, intellectual,
decent kind of point of view. I mean, that's why it was good to work for him. He was not, I
regarded McGovern as superficial and sort of a gadfly. Muskie did the work of a senator. It's
work, it's a job, you know, there are things to do. And he took his committee assignments and,
you know, did good stuff with committee assignments that . . . .
I mean the story about him, his committee assignments, and Lyndon Johnson is a great story, I
mean on several respects. First of all he kicked a little dust in Johnson's face, but then he took
what he'd been given, didn't complain about it, and did good work through those committees. I
don't mean to say that there was nothing, you know, I don't mean to make it sound ordinary,
because I think a lot of the guys up there don't, well, they don't produce as much. I mean, he had
to have been different.
DN: You've referred in the course of our conversations to a kaleidoscope of individuals. Over
the years, I get the sense that you've kept in touch with a fair number of them. And what, is there
a glue that holds these former Muskie staffers together, or is it simply that they are like-minded
individuals who enjoy each other's company and find it stimulating?
LL: I don't see as many as, you know, Eliot and Leon [Billings] probably, or in the circle
down, you know, downtown, I mean they've got that whole, Charlene [Sturbitts] and all, and Bob
Rose and everybody. I mean, when I see those people I'm very happy to see them, but I don't
socialize, I don’t socialize with them. I’ll get together with Jane Fenderson if she's here. And,
you know, when you work with people as long as that, you become friends and I think it's
probably, obviously there are common experiences that people share. But I don't think that, I

wouldn't say that it's a Muskie glue, it's, you know, we became friends because, through him.
DN:

What would you say is a hallmark of Muskie, that his staff understood?

LL: Not so much as understand but feel. I would bet you that virtually everyone who worked
for him regarded it as a privilege to have worked for someone of his, I always come back to
integrity and intellectual rigor. That's how, I remember feeling that so clearly when George
[Mitchell] and Mark Shields were doing, you know, they were on the News Hour, when Muskie
died. And it was just, it was kind of a summation, and it was such, it was so clear to me that,
how incredibly lucky I was, you know. I was a girl from Texas, I didn't know squat about
Maine, and to sort of be taken in by you and be given these opportunities was fabulous. But then
to be able to work for this man who really was, was really quite remarkable and who, and the
integrity thing almost more than anything. I bet you every sing-, I bet you nobody, you didn't
ever hear stories about him cutting corners. Tempers, you know, that's what you heard, but you
didn't ever hear about compromise of, I'm sure there were compromises, but you didn't hear
about compromise of basic principle, and I bet you that would be what everybody would say
about him. That his bedrock integrity.
DN:

Thank you very much, Lee.

End of Interview

